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The current neuroscience of memory takes on board the remarkable achievements of molecular neurobi-
ology and merges them with findings from systems neuroscience and cognitive psychology. This results
in a highly dynamic depiction of the memory trace, appreciating its restlessness and incessant assimilation
into accumulating knowledge. With an armamentarium of amazing methodologies at hand, and more around
the corner, we still lack dictionaries of neuronal codes, able to translate spatiotemporal patterns of brain
activity into behavioral tokens. But the path to getting there continues to fascinate, to be accompanied by
fresh challenges and new approaches.The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.
L.P. Hartley’s poetic ode to nostalgia (The Go-Between)
shrinks to a bare factual statement upon comparing memory
research reported in Neuron in its first days and now. The
first experimental paper to explicitly target putative memory-
related research in Neuron used acute single microelectrode
recording in hippocampal slice (Kauer et al., 1988). Twenty-
five years and 8,000 articles later (over 400 of which are
research papers with learning or memory in their title, with
many more on neuronal plasticity at large), a study of memory
in the mammalian brain reported in Neuron may already
combine chronic tetrode recording arrays and precise optoge-
netic perturbation in the freely behaving rat (Smith and Gray-
biel, 2013).
That the contemporary tools of the trade are first and foremost
options that creative scientific minds use in new ways is evident
from the fact that both of these papers can be considered
groundbreaking at their time. Expanding the toolbox available
to the discipline, which has perhaps happened most strikingly
in the last decade, enables neuroscience to take new steps for-
ward. Imagine, for example, human memory research now in the
absence of noninvasive functional imaging; the advances in our
understanding of our own brain machinery is even more impres-
sive given that this popular capability was unavailable only a
rather short scientific-while ago (the first positron emission
tomography [PET] study of human memory to appear in Neuron
was in 1996 [Schacter et al., 1996], with the first fMRI paper
following shortly thereafter). When Neuron started almost a
decade earlier, cognitive neuroscientists really did do things
differently.
The technology has changed and with it some of the
questions that can be tackled more successfully. But has
the evolution of methods, concepts, and data blended with
creativity to advance the character of memory research in the
past 25 years? Our view is that they are doing so, and we
now reflect on the future implications of the current state of
the art. We attempt to chart patches of the changed terrain
of the science of memory and how it has changed and
propose a few idiosyncratic conclusions on where it might be
going.742 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Time Present and Time Past
The Trace Goes Dynamic
Psychological conceptions of learning and memory have long
distinguished the acquisition or ‘‘encoding’’ process, from that
of ‘‘trace storage’’ and the subsequent processes of ‘‘consolida-
tion’’ that somehow enable storage to be lasting. Efforts to trans-
late these concepts into the neurobiological domain distinguish
the very rapid events associated with memory encoding in
one-shot learning, such as activation of the glutamate NMDA re-
ceptor in neurons of the hippocampus, with those associated
with the subsequent creation of biophysical, biochemical, or
structural changes thought to mediate lasting trace storage. A
memory ‘‘trace’’ or ‘‘engram’’ is a hypothetical entity that refers
to physical changes in the nervous system that outlast the stim-
ulus. However, while the trace may be created and sustained for
a while, that is no guarantee that it will last. All too often, as in
long-term potentiation decaying back to ‘‘baseline’’ levels, expe-
rience-induced perturbations of structure and function are short
lasting. However, a key idea was that a consolidation process
can be engaged to enable these physical changes to be sus-
tained and then to last indefinitely (McGaugh, 1966).
Specifically, much of the research in the neuroscience of
memory in the past century was embedded in the conceptual
framework of a ‘‘dual-trace’’ model (Hebb, 1949): a short-term
trace, which dissipates rapidly unless converted by consolida-
tion into a long-term trace. It was generally thought that consol-
idation occurs just once per item and that the long-term trace
would be stable and essentially permanent unless the areas of
the brain that store the memory were damaged or the ability to
retrieve the information somehow impaired. This conceptual
framework was strongly influenced by the view that the neurobi-
ological mechanisms of consolidation and maintenance of long-
term memory are similar or even identical to those operating in
tissue development, in which the cells become committed to
their fate for the rest of their life unless struck by an injury or
pathology. Indeed, much in the models and terminology of the
highly successful molecular neurobiology of memory (Kandel,
2001) resonates with the reductionist world of the molecular
biology of development. The influence and the interest of devel-
opmental neurobiologists in memory mechanisms continues to
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be less fixed than they once seemed (Hu¨bener and Bonhoeffer,
2010).
The initial reductionist approach to neurobiology (Benzer,
1967; Kandel and Spencer, 1968) resulted in portrayal of a
dynamic microcosmos within synapses and neurons. This was
in regard to the encoding of the memory and its possible transi-
tion from a short-term to a long-term trace. The proposedmolec-
ular and cellular mechanisms of encoding and consolidation in
even the simplest forms of learning, such as habituation, sensiti-
zation, and classical conditioning, were depicted as interacting
signal-transduction cascades of synapse-to-nucleus-to-syn-
apse communication, each shaped by state-dependent checks
and balances of facilitation and repression. Particularly influential
has been the research program of reflex modification in Aplysia
(Castellucci et al., 1970; Kandel and Schwartz, 1982; Bartsch
et al., 1995; Byrne and Kandel, 1996; Martin et al., 1997; Bailey
and Chen, 1988; Shobe et al., 2009). A complementary picture
emerged from the neurogenetic analysis of memory in
Drosophila (Dudai et al., 1976; Dubnau and Tully, 1998; Waddell
and Quinn, 2001; Keleman et al., 2007), in which lines such as
amnesiac remain memorable for their failure to make this
short-to-long transition coupled to some missing aspects of
these cascades. These and studies in other organisms and
model systems (e.g., Etcheberrigaray et al., 1992; Malenka and
Bear, 2004; Gao et al., 2012) unveiled a rich molecular toolbox
of neuronal plasticity that has been conserved and elaborated
in evolution to permit memory traces to be formed (Kandel,
2001; Glanzman, 2010).
Yet the outcome—the ‘‘stored’’ long-term trace—was still
conveniently considered by many as ‘‘fixed.’’ The flexibility of
behavior was appreciated, even championed, but a conceptual
distinction was nonetheless made between the postulated
permanence of thememory trace and its flexible use in providing
the organism with capacity to vary its response to the world
(McGaugh, 1966). This dissonance between the assumed engra-
matic stability and the observed behavioral mutability was even
insightfully considered embarrassing (McGaugh, 1966) and
hence in need of resolution.
On this point, some views in early cognitive and social psy-
chology were arguably rather different. Here, the reconstructive
but frail nature of real-life memory was an engine of excitement
rather than of embarrassment (Bartlett, 1932) and served as a
basis for influential experiments (Deese, 1959) that decades
later found their way into brain research (Schacter et al.,
1996). A major trend in the evolving science of human memory
is bridging the gap between cognitive psychology concepts
and the molecular and cognitive neuroscience views of
memory. Whereas the cognitive psychology of memory opens
out to biological interpretations of behavioral phenomena
(e.g., retroactive memory interference interpreted as memory
consolidation; Wixted, 2004), molecular and cognitive neuro-
science is at last beginning to appreciate the restless, ever
changing, and reconstructive nature of memory cherished by
cognitive psychology (Dudai, 2012). In this respect, neurosci-
ence is coming of age; we have moved away from the silos
of thinking that permeated separate departments of psychol-
ogy, physiology, and molecular biology to recognition thatdifferent levels of analysis have things to say to each other
(Roediger et al., 2007).
Four examples illustrate this trend toward a more dynamic
conception of the trace and of memory processing in general.
The first refers to the ostensible and now questionable perma-
nence of the consolidated trace; another to the veracity of
memory; a third to the nature of the representations formed
and the assimilation of new information into previously stored
representations; and a fourth to the supposition that retrieval
may represent a transient alliance of representations.
The Trace Reboots
The view that consolidation occurs just once per item was chal-
lenged in the late 1960s by reports that presentation of a
‘‘reminder cue’’ rendered a seemingly consolidated long-term
memory item again labile to amnesic agents (Misanin et al.,
1968). This reactivation-induced reopening of a consolidation-
like window called into question the supposition that consolida-
tion produced immutable stability and so came later to be
termed ‘‘reconsolidation’’ (Sara, 2000). Some methodological
concerns combined with the capricious nature of the history
and sociology of science pushed reconsolidation under the radar
for many years. A major step forward came with a study that
replicated Misanin’s observation of reconsolidation but did so
by applying an amnesic agent directly into the identified amyg-
dalar circuit that mediates long-term fear conditioning (Nader
et al., 2000). This single paper had an unprecedented influence
on the popularity of reconsolidation as a process to study, with
the annual number of papers that describe and analyze the phe-
nomenon soaring 50-fold within a few years. Besides providing
new insights into the molecular and brain mechanisms of mem-
ory, the initially subversive concept of reconsolidation was
rapidly subsumed into mainstream neuroscience. There has
been extensive work on specifying the boundary conditions of
reconsolidation, on pharmacological and molecular dissocia-
tions between consolidation and reconsolidation, and on the
possible relevance of reconsolidation to cognitive and behav-
ioral therapies for diverse conditions (Alberini, 2005; Nader and
Hardt, 2009; Dudai, 2012).
The Trace Errs
In the classical neurobiological sequence of memory processes,
operating in a healthy nervous system, there is seemingly little
room for error. What will later be retrieved from the passive attic
of stored traces must, of necessity, be what was put there in the
first place. It took decades for the normal imperfections of mem-
ory to be considered by brain scientists as natural and research-
worthy phenomena (Schacter, 2001). This may sound surprising
to the biological ear, even if only because modern biology rests
on the shoulders of molecular genetics, which uses imperfec-
tions (mutations) as its most effective and successful research
tool. In early cognitive neuroscience as well, brain damage that
caused abnormalities of function was the gateway to under-
standing the key attributes of memory systems that should ordi-
narily work as they evolved to do, but the supposition was that
subjects without such damage would display memory pro-
cesses that behaved in a well-brought-up manner.
Again, bibliometrics illuminates the trend. Between 1985 and
1999, only 63 papers in the Science Citation Index (Thomson
Reuters) had ‘‘[brain AND memory AND false]’’ in their title,Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 743
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doubling of the number of papers having brain as their topic
between these periods, this still yields a 5-fold increase in the
interest of the neuroscience community in the inaccuracies
inherent in our memory.
A particular contribution to this trend was provided by the
introduction of noninvasive functional imaging methods, mainly
fMRI, that collectively permit convenient investigation of the
brain of healthy participants. Coupled to adaptation of classic
protocols used in cognitive psychology to the scanner environ-
ment, imaging has confirmed that the brain does indeed deserve
its renewed reputation as an occasionally mischievous mne-
monic device. All in all, the emerging picture is that recollection
is a reconstructive process that is naturally prone to various
types of intrusions, modifications, and even illusions (Schacter
and Addis, 2007). This apparent sloppiness includes, among
others, mistakes in identifying the source of the information
(‘‘misattribution’’), incorporation of misleading and superfluous
external or internal information, and bias by previous knowledge
and belief (Schacter, 2001)—all indicating that either the trace is
far from being a static replica of the original experience or that
the recollective process acts on a veridical trace to produce a
memory of questionable veracity. That these ‘‘sins of memory,’’
as Schacter aptly describes them, may have a selective advan-
tage should not be forgotten; for example, one could suggest
that retaining the gist without remaining bound for too long to
the full details of an experienced episode may facilitate anticipa-
tion of future different scenarios and promote creative imagina-
tion (Bar, 2009; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009).
Studies involvingmultiple techniques have identified a number
of potential mechanisms by which memory might have the
opportunity to drift from the ostensibly exact coordinates of
real events. One might envisage that this could happen, for
example, in the immediate offline fast compressed replay of an
episode (Davidson et al., 2009), during reactivation and consol-
idation of episodes in sleep during the night after (Diekelmann
and Born, 2010), in slow systems consolidation that trims repre-
sentations and converts episodic into semantic knowledge
(Winocur et al., 2010; Furman et al., 2012), in fast systems
consolidation in which new information is assimilated into exist-
ing mental schemas (Tse et al., 2007; see below), and, finally, in
updating during reconsolidation (Wang and Morris, 2010).
Assimilation of the New with the Old
The classic approach to laboratory experimentation on learning
and memory, certainly in animal laboratories, is the conduct of
the study with subjects that are considered to have either no
previous experience with the specific task or, at least, equivalent
but well-controlled experience. This simplicity has long been
thought to be the best way to identify the quintessential mecha-
nisms of encoding, storage, consolidation, and retrieval. The
problem is that this is artificial, because adult organismswill typi-
cally have a great deal of prior knowledge, and its possession
may change the manner in which these processes occur.
The impact of prior knowledge is greater or lesser for certain
forms of representation. In cases in which the emotional or affec-
tive value of a stimulus is strongly changed by a conditioning
experience, prior knowledge will generally have little influence.
An innocuous stimulus may have a long history of being innoc-744 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.uous, but the sound of the weekly fire alarm coupled to visible
flames and the smell of smoke changes things forever. However,
in cases in which learning involves forming an association,
whereby one stimulus can evoke the memory of another, or
where one is a label or even the meaning of another, prior knowl-
edge is likely to have a critical impact.
Contrast two cases. Certain forms of associative learning
studied in the standard way are quite well understood with, for
example, the specific role of the amygdala in cued fear condition-
ing now worked out at the level of the neural circuits, receptors,
and molecules involved. Conveniently, the amygdala is posi-
tioned such that the changed activity of its neuronal output
pathways has a direct effect on heart rate and numerous other
sympathetic and parasympathetic expression systems. Thus,
behavioral (freezing) and other changes (heart rate) are readily
observed. Froma representational perspective, this formof asso-
ciative conditioning may only require a change in the value of the
predicting conditioned stimulus (CS) such that it now has access
to output pathways useful in circumstances of danger. The past
history of CS neutrality may result in some degree of ‘‘latent inhi-
bition’’ but does not otherwise affect this capacity for learning.
In contrast, the parallel-distributed associative machinery of
the neocortex is able to store ‘‘associations’’ of the representa-
tional form that CS1 evokes a memory of CS2 (Holland, 1990;
for an earlier discussion of such type of associations, see Konor-
ski, 1950). This form of learning is likely different from cued fear
conditioning in that CS1 now does not change value to be quan-
titatively like that of CS2 but, rather, enters into a network of
associations that will ultimately come together as a system of
knowledge. Paired-associative learning of this form has long
been recognized, both within the animal learning community in
studies of intentional actions (Dickinson, 1980) and in neurosci-
ence startingwith the seminal studies ofMiyashita on the electro-
physiological signature of fractal pairings (Miyashita et al., 1993).
Research on ‘‘systems consolidation’’ at the memory circuits
level, which is distinct from research on ‘‘cellular consolidation’’
at the single-cell level (Dudai and Morris, 2000), has led to the
idea that the distributed circuitry of the hippocampus performs
avariety of encoding-related operations to stimuli suchaspattern
separation and pattern completion before subsequently creating
event-event or event-context associations that may then be sub-
ject to consolidation in neocortex (McClelland and Goddard,
1996). The hippocampus and neocortex are hence considered
as complementary learning systems (CLSs; McClelland and
Goddard, 1996). Whereas the hippocampus is good at putting
anything together with anything, and particularly with spatial
information in the case of rodents, the neocortex readily forms
representations of individual stimuli but is more restricted
functionally in its capacity to linkdisparate information (e.g., infor-
mation in distinct sensory processing systems). The neuroana-
tomical connectivity required may be present, but the strength
of connections is initially weak, with experience being the guide
as to what gets functionally connected to what. The combined
forces of flexible hippocampal-dependent learning, systems
consolidation, and the vast storage capacities of the neocortex
collectively realize the ‘‘binding’’ task of understanding and rep-
resenting the world around us and not just changing behavior
adaptively to deal with specific types of association.
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as one that is influenced by what has gone before. One recent
example that combines thinking about prior knowledge with
representational associations is the idea of forming ‘‘schemas’’
around related paired associates that then alter the rate at which
new paired associates can be learned and consolidated (Tse
et al., 2007). Specifically, animals are trained to enable one of
several flavors of food to be associated with and thus predict
the location where more of that foodstuff is available. In this
case, neither the different flavors of food nor the locations
change ‘‘value’’ in the manner that a context does in context
fear conditioning; what changes is the ability of one set of cues
(flavors) to evoke a memory of the other (places). The use of pla-
ces also enables the animals to gradually build up a representa-
tion of the testing space, over several weeks of training, such that
they may be thought to have a mental schema that connects
these otherwise independent associations into some kind of
framework. Interestingly, once this had been achieved, the en-
coding, storage, and consolidation of new paired associates
can become very rapid—even though it was shown to entail
consolidation in the neocortex that had previously been thought
to require weeks to accomplish (Tse et al., 2011).
This work was originally suggested as a challenge to the CLS
approach, but new work by McClelland (2013) indicates that
these findings can be readily accommodated by this framework.
Whereas catastrophic interference can occur when new infor-
mation conflicts with prior associations, necessitating two sepa-
rate but interdependent learning systems, the new analysis
suggests that synergistic effects are seenwhen the new informa-
tion to be assimilated is concordant with past associations. This
animal and computational work on paired-associate learning is
also being considered in elegant human fMRI studies of
schema-associated assimilation that point to critical interactions
between the medial temporal lobe, prefrontal cortex, and other
neocortical regions (van Kesteren et al., 2010) and new models
of processing that suggest a differential role for the hippocam-
pus and prefrontal cortex as a function of prior knowledge (van
Kesteren et al., 2012).
Trace Alliances
Data from both animal and human studies support the notion
that the expression of memory involves a transient alliance of
representations (Buzsa´ki, 2010; Watrous et al., 2013). The notion
of highly distributed representations, raised over the years by
both theoretical and experimental programs (Hebb, 1949; Lash-
ley, 1950; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), hence gains an
invigorating new twist. In it, the embodiment of memory items
is portrayed as dynamic, ad hoc global network interactions,
perhaps mediated by frequency-specific connectivity.
A recent example on how thismay happen in episodicmemory
in the human brain is provided byWatrous et al. (2013). They em-
ployed simultaneous electrocorticographical (ECoG) recordings
in patients undergoing seizure monitoring and recorded from
areas in the medial temporal lobe (MTL), prefrontal cortex
(PFC), and parietal cortex, which are the main components of
the brain network that is activated in retrieval. The patients
were engaged in retrieving spatial and temporal contexts asso-
ciated with an episode. Phase synchronization was used as a
measure of network connectivity. Watrous et al. (2013) foundthat successful retrieval was associated with greater global con-
nectivity among the sites in the 1–10 Hz band, with the MTL
acting as a hub for the interactions. Notably, spatial versus tem-
poral context retrieval resulted in differences in the spectral and
temporal patterns of the network interactions: while correct
spatial retrieval was characterized by lower-frequency interac-
tions across the network along with early and prolonged
increases in connectivity, temporal order retrieval was charac-
terized by faster-frequency interactions, a more delayed in-
crease in network connectivity, and a lower temporal coherence
across the network compared with the spatial retrieval. Thus, an
alliance of brain regions, with frequency-specific connectivity
between them, rather than regionally mediated activity alone,
could be central to many instances of retrieval and probably to
the formation, maintenance, and updating of episodic memory.
Furthermore, it appears that frequency-specific patterns of
interregional phase synchronization in large-scale networks
can provide insight into howmultiple contexts underlying a single
episode can be recreated in the same network.
Candidate coalitions of memory-related representations are
also unveiled by methodologies tapping into longer temporal in-
tervals. Methods for assessing functional connectivity in human
fMRI data unveil sets of coactivations of regions subserving
episodic recollection (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2005; Maguire
et al., 2000; Burianova´ et al., 2012). Within the animal domain,
immediate early gene (IEG) mapping offers another opportunity
to examine the coactivation and possible coordination of neu-
rons in multiple brain areas during memory retrieval—as re-
ported by Wheeler et al. (2013) for context fear conditioning.
Whereas we used to think of plasticity-related gene activation
as triggered solely by encoding and necessary for storage,
research on reconsolidation (see ‘‘trace rebooting’’ above) has
alerted us to the phenomena of gene activation during and after
a retrieval session. While the timescale of IEG expression is at
least three orders of magnitude slower than that studied in
ECoG, obscuring whether gene activation is triggered by,
required for, or is some epiphenomenon of memory retrieval, it
nonetheless offers an opportunity to examine the dynamics of
trace activation across the brain. Wheeler et al. (2013) establish
that the network interactions that are seen in IEG expression
change as a representation consolidates over time.
Time Present and Time Future
T.S. Eliot, whose insights intomemory infiltrate our subtitles, saw
that life had its retrospective, immediate, and prospective ele-
ments. The last of these applies even to memory itself, with a
growing number of investigators considering planning from the
perspective of memory (Schacter and Addis, 2007; Thom
et al., 2013). The prospective aspect of memory research is
also intriguing. Given our argument that contemporary concep-
tions of memory processing are diverting from our dual-trace
and fixed storage heritage, we can usefully ask, ‘‘Where are we
going’’?
In Search of the Engramatic Code
Memory is traditionally measured in terms of the change in an in-
dividual’s behavior that results from their behavioral experience.
This change reflects the encoding and retention over time of
experience-dependent internal representations in the brain orNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 745
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(Dudai, 2002). Representations, unless possibly of very elemen-
tary reflexes, are commonly postulated to be encoded in the
spatiotemporal activity of neural circuits, ensembles, or Hebbian
‘‘cell assemblies’’ (Buzsa´ki, 2010). The number of neurons
required for a physiologically meaningful representation need
not be big (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998), but it is important to
recognize that it is commonly assumed to be more than one
neuron, even though mechanisms are often discussed as if
change happens at a small subset of synapses in a single
neuron. The influential reductionist revolution in memory
research (Kandel, 2001) focused initially on the molecular mech-
anisms of synaptic plasticity that are hypothesized to allow
memory to take place in the first place (Martin et al., 2000).
Hence, the search for the engram in major parts of the discipline
tilted for a while more toward the search for the identity and func-
tion of the molecular and cellular ‘‘nuts and bolts’’ of engramatic
machinery rather than the issue of how circuit activity represents
the cognitive and behavioral content encoded in the trace. But
the ever swinging pendulum of science is now reverting to a
more active consideration of the place of circuits, including
microcircuits, and how they may mediate diverse aspects of
cognitive function. Already we see growing interest in inhibitory
neurons as well as excitatory neurons and regulation of the bal-
ance of their influence on processing via homeostatic regulation
(Turrigiano, 2008), in the selective role of synapses at specific
parts of a dendritic tree, on the soma, or on axons (Somogyi
and Klausberger, 2005), and the contribution that synaptic inte-
gration and clustered plasticity may make to representations
(Govindarajan et al., 2006; Branco and Ha¨usser, 2011). This
circuit revolution takes on board the earlier understanding of
activity-dependent synaptic plasticity (Bliss and Collingridge,
1993; Kandel, 2001) and deploys some of the same neurobiolog-
ical tools as in the past, but there is a growing sense that the
mechanisms of memory will not be satisfactorily understood in
the absence of elucidation of the circuit code(s) of internal repre-
sentations for which some of the new tools available will be
invaluable.
Progress continues to be made through novel theoretical
ideas and via incremental refinements to long-established
techniques coupled to elegant behavioral paradigms and fresh
analysis methods. Notable, though definitely not exhaustive, ex-
amples include the development of multivoxel pattern analysis
techniques in cases in which a qualitative rather than a quantita-
tive change in the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal
is expected as in episodicmemory encoding and retrieval (Chad-
wick et al., 2012; Kuhl et al., 2012); the use of long-established
tetrode recording techniques to discover yet more about place
cells, head direction, and grid cells and their role in providing a
spatial framework for navigation and the anchoring of event
memory (Burgess et al., 2002; Taube, 2007; Moser et al.,
2008); new twists to the hippocampal tale such as ‘‘time cells’’
in the rat hippocampus (Kraus et al., 2013); the combination of
tetrode recording in the macaque with fMRI in humans to unveil
conserved patterns of neural activity across the medial temporal
lobe during associative learning (Hargreaves et al., 2012); and
the exploitation of advanced molecular biology to unveil the
role of epigenesis in plasticity and memory (Day and Sweatt,746 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.2011), for example, the involvement of small RNAs in epigenetic
control of persistent synaptic facilitation in Aplysia (Rajasethupa-
thy et al., 2012).
However, recent outstanding technical developments add sig-
nificant power to the reductionist approach to memory but also
permit more effective approaches to the identification of the
representational content and dynamics of memory items in the
behaving organism at the circuit level. The technological
advances augment and feed the realization that circuit research
will move us to the next stage of understanding perceptual,
attentional, and mnemonic codes. An emerging assumption is
that understanding the patterns of firing of identified neurons in
specific macro- and microcircuits will constitute the level of
detail to which we must turn. But how? It is now becoming
possible, using combinations of advanced electrical recording,
miniaturized in vivo chronic microscopy, conditional genetic
switches, and optogenetics, both to monitor the activity of
such neurons and circuits and also to perturb selected elements
of this activity with a view to making causal inferences about
mechanisms. Activating and inhibiting these elements will play
an increasingly critical role in establishing sufficiency with
respect to expressing the elements of memory.
Much of this type of work is conducted on the hippocampus,
long implicated in multiple aspects of mammalian memory
(Buzsa´ki and Moser, 2013), although the amygdala, subserving
fear conditioning, is also a favorable target (Zhou et al., 2009;
Johansen et al., 2010). The neocortex, commandingly positioned
above the fray, is gaining the renewed interest it deserves (Gil-
martin et al., 2013). Selected examples in animal models include:
(1) identification in the behavingmouse of neuronal traces of spe-
cific fear-context associations and the generation of synthetic
memory traces of such associations by selective activation of
neurons engineered to carry receptors exclusively activated by
designer drugs (Garner et al., 2012); (2) labeling of specific
ensembles contributing to the fear-context engram with chan-
nelrhodopsin and subsequent optogenetic reactivation of the
ensemble (Liu et al., 2012); and (3) identification by hippocampal
recording with chronic tetrode arrays of compressed activity sig-
natures during sharp-wave ripples that may represent specific
spatial memory information (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). Whether
the activity signatures unveiled in these and other studies are or
are part of the neural code of active memory representations still
awaits further investigation, e.g., on how these messages are
read and construed by downstream brain circuits (Buzsa´ki,
2010). But these findings represent a significant step forward
on the road to decipher the neuronal language of memory.
In humans, still limited at the time of writing by the lower tem-
poral and/or spatial resolution of current noninvasive functional
imaging and the relatively crude methods of ‘‘noninvasive’’ inter-
vention (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation and direct
current stimulation), the pace of advance is a bit slower but still
highly noticeable. Classifier multivoxel pattern analysis, noted
above, already permits identification of BOLD signatures of
some types of visual categories (though not tokens within these
types) in candidate memory representations (Rissman andWag-
ner, 2012). Intracranial electrophysiology in human patients is
inherently limited in terms of scope and experimental design,
but the expanding use of this approach, ranging from ECoG
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to provide further information on the correlation, and ultimately
necessity and sufficiency, of neuronal memory representations
(Suthana and Fried, 2012).
The trend, made possible by the fast development of
advanced techniques, is to tap further into the network alliances,
global circuits, and microcircuit processes and cellular mecha-
nisms that process information for effective encoding, create
suitable representations, and maintain information over time.
This trend is likely to gain further momentum in the forthcoming
decade, driven by research questions in basic science but also
by potential clinical applications involving brain-machine inter-
face (BMI) and the development of neuromorphic technology
(see below).
Increasing Realism
The scientific era in human memory research began with an
intentional and systematic disregard to the meaning of the infor-
mation to be remembered by selecting nonsense syllables as
memoranda (Ebbinghaus, 1885). In animal learning also, there
had been a supposition early on that an abstract and mathemat-
ical account of all there was to know about learning could be
realized from studying the behavior of a rat at the choice point
of a maze—culminating in the formalisms of Hull (1951) that
are now, perhaps fortunately, lost to time. The dominance of
simple, quantifiable, yet artificial and often meaningless, memo-
randa provoked Neisser (1978), almost a century later, to ques-
tion whether psychologists were studying interesting or socially
significant aspects of memory. Part of the Ebbinghausian tradi-
tion was carried into the human fMRI protocols, e.g., strings of
paired associates composed of normally unrelated words or
arbitrary still pictures to model episodic encoding. This was
highly productive, but in recent years, more realistic learning
andmemory paradigms are encountered in the scanner environ-
ment, including the use of movies as episodic memoranda (Has-
son et al., 2008), of navigation by knowledgeable taxi drivers
(Hartley et al., 2003), recollections modified by social interac-
tions (Edelson et al., 2011), and the use of that universal engine
of memory, fear, under strikingly realistic conditions (Sharot
et al., 2007). In parallel, it is noteworthy that the outcome of
research on brain and cognitive mechanisms of memory spills
into key aspects of daily life and society (Schacter and Loftus,
2013). The growth of ‘‘social neuroscience’’ portends growing in-
terest in social aspects of memory in both human and animal-
based neuroscience.
Similarly, it seems that more attention is devoted to the effec-
tiveness of realistic milieu in animal models used in memory
research, with renewed emphasis on the real-life cognitive uni-
verse of rodents (particularly space, odors, somatosensory
stimuli, and their interactions, e.g., Morris et al., 2006; Sauvage
et al., 2008; Buzsa´ki and Moser, 2013). The general understand-
ing, itself rooted in several older animal psychology schools and
now resurrected, is that animals learn better when the memo-
randa make sense in their world. Hints of a similar trend seem
to emerge in the primate literature as well (Paxton et al.,
2010). It is likely that widespread use of novel consumer tech-
nology (such as Google-type glasses or personal activity moni-
tors), miniaturization of noninvasive functional imaging devices
for humans, and facilitated real-time web communication willrender more realistic memory experiments easier and more
popular.
Memory Systems Updated?
The dominant taxonomy of memory systems, echoing earlier
philosophical notions (Ryle, 1949), was shaped by studies of
‘‘global amnesics’’ like H.M. and other patients (Scoville and Mil-
ner, 1957; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Squire and Wixted, 2011),
supported by lesion studies in animal models (Mishkin, 1982;
Olton et al., 1979; Fanselow, 2010). It has long portrayed the
brain as possessing two major types of memory systems—
declarative (explicit) memory for facts and events, for people,
places, and objects (‘‘knowing that’’) and nondeclarative (im-
plicit) memory, the memory for perceptual and motor skills
(‘‘knowing how’’). Whereas declarative memory is held to involve
particular types of representation and conscious awareness for
recollection, it also requires an intact hippocampus—at least at
the time that a memory is acquired. In contrast, nondeclarative
memory is thought to be a heterogeneous collection of experi-
ence-dependent changes shown in behavior and not to rely on
the hippocampus but on a number of other brain systems: the
cerebellum, the striatum, the amygdala, and, particularly in inver-
tebrates, simple reflex pathways themselves. This taxonomy
was immensely useful as a conceptual framework for both
human and animal studies, in teaching where it is little short of
a blessing, and as an engine for new experimental programs.
Recent ideas and data, however, have raised questions about
this taxonomy. One issue relates to what can be concluded
from brain damage/lesion studies, which identify necessity,
compared to physiological approaches, which measure corre-
lates of a presumed process—be it in neural firing, BOLD, IEG
activation, or in other ways. Specifically, the demonstration in
double-dissociation lesion studies that the integrity of the hippo-
campus is not necessary for declarative memory retrieval after a
long consolidation period (e.g., retrieval of semantic memory)
need not imply, as perhaps it was taken to do so in the past,
that it cannot or does not participate when functioning normally.
Functional imaging data suggest, in contrast, that brain circuits
traditionally considered to be the hallmark of declarativememory
(hippocampus) or of procedural memory (basal ganglia) take
part, in the healthy brain, in tasks in which they may not previ-
ously have been expected to play a role (Reber et al., 2012;
Scimeca and Badre, 2012; see also Voss et al., 2012). There is
also a growing realization that the classic temporal gradient of
retrograde amnesia, challenged in the development of the
multiple-trace theory of Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), may not
be reliably secured in animal models. Related to growing uncer-
tainty about the taxonomy is the question whether ‘‘conscious
awareness’’ is indeed a natural type of classifier for memory sys-
tems (Henke, 2010).
This also raises the more general question of what memory
systems are (Roediger et al., 2007). Are such systems rigidly in-
terconnected sets of brain areas dedicated to specific types of
mnemonic tasks? Or should they be considered as ad hoc coa-
litions of computational modules that are recruited per task
(Cabeza andMoscovitch, 2013)? The latter view resonates nicely
with the dynamic view of memory expression, discussed above.
It is likely that in the forthcoming years our view of memory sys-
tems will become updated, not unlike memory itself.Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 747
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Coinciding with the 25th anniversary of Neuron is a new revolu-
tion in neuroscience. Not only have concepts ofmemory-in-brain
changed over the past 25 years, partly in response to the
astounding new methodologies that are altering the way brain
research is done, but also the style of work is changing. The
discipline itself is experimenting, not without intense debates,
in ‘‘big science’’ projects that reflect the colossal demands
imposed by the sheer complexity of the brain and the technolog-
ical and cognitive resources required to tackle them effectively
(Kandel et al., 2013). Whatever path this revolution takes, it is
highly likely that some of the achievements of the multipronged
new sciences of the brain will culminate in understandings and
capabilities that not long ago were confined to fictional universes
only, and some of these will be directly related to human
memory.
One possibility is that the science of biological memory will
make the leap from the vintage point of the curious observer to
that of the active player. Some harbingers are already with us:
new attempts to enhance memory, which have a long history
(for a recent basic science example, see Alberini and Chen,
2012), or attempts to erase memory to ameliorate posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) in humans guided by research on recon-
solidation (Schiller et al., 2010). But one should consider also the
potential capabilities of brain-machine interfaces (BMIs, e.g.,
Hatsopoulos and Donoghue, 2009) not only to compensate for
the deficits and retrain lesioned brain and bodies, but also,
once noninvasive techniques are further developed, to augment
the capability of intact brains. The potential ethical and social
implications of such capabilities should not escape our notice.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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